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Introduction
To Chinese officials who are in charge of financial reform, the summerof 2015 has been disturbingly eventful. China’s stock market hasplunged since mid-June after months of sharp rise. In less than three
months, the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) Composite Index dropped from
5,166 point on 12 June to 2,927 point on 26 August, representing a 43%
drop in stock value. The RMB devaluation in August took global investors
and international trading partners by surprise, causing an unintended dis-
turbance to the global financial markets in the shadow of China’s lower-
than-expected economic growth. All this has put China under the spotlight
across the globe. While China is already the world’s second largest economy,
its financial system is relatively less developed and is prone to market
volatility. The long quest to internationalise the Chinese currency, the yuan
or Renminbi (RMB), remains in progress amidst the financial turmoil in
China. The question of the extent to which the Chinese government will
allow a greater role for the market in currency reform continues to be the
crux of the issue.
Review of financial reform in China
Before the onset of economic reform, the People’s Bank of China (PBOC)
was tasked with handling almost all lending related to industrial, commer-
cial, and rural uses. (1) The Chinese currency exchange rate was administra-
tively set by the state and merely acted as a tool for accounting purpose in
the area of foreign trade. At that time all the foreign exchange earned from
foreign trade had to be sold to the state. (2)
Since the economic reforms, China has gradually opened up its market to
the world and loosened its restrictions on foreign investment and trade, at-
tracting a surge of foreign loans and direct foreign investment (FDI). The
State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE, guojia waihui guanliju 國
家外匯管理局) was established in 1979 to supervise the national balance
of payments. (3) In 1981, the dual exchange rate system was created to han-
dle the conversion of foreign currencies into RMB. The PBOC was also re-
structured in 1984 to separate it from four state-owned commercial banks,
enabling it to focus solely on devising macro-economic monetary policies,
and it officially became the central bank of China in 1995. Nowadays the
banking system in China remains firmly controlled by the Chinese Commu-
nist Party (CCP) and serves as the backbone of the financial sector by dis-
tributing most of the loans for business activities. Financing through market
capitalisation from the stock market or other financial means in China is
comparatively insignificant, (4) although given the sheer size of China’s econ-
omy, the volume of market capitalisation is already huge if compared with
other financial markets.
Over the years, China recorded a longstanding “twin surplus” in both cur-
rent and capital accounts. The increased volume of FDI and net surplus from
foreign trade created an unprecedented amount of foreign reserves in the
PBOC. The inflow of foreign currencies intensified when China joined the
World Trade Organisation (WTO). As required by the WTO, China has fully
opened its current account since its accession. The capital account, however,
was only partially opened under the control of the authorities. The persistent
national imbalance of payments has made China a target of international
criticism, especially from the US. (5) In response, China allowed the yuan to
appreciate in value over time. In 1997-2005, the PBOC pegged the RMB to
the US dollar. Since July 2005, the yuan’s exchange rate was allowed to
fluctuate within a trading band in reference to a basket of foreign currencies,
and the trading band has been further widened to better reflect its market
value since 2007. In May 2015, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for
the first time declared that the yuan was no longer undervalued given its
recent value appreciation, (6) although the exchange rate is yet to be deter-
mined solely by the market.
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Integral to the plan to bring in foreign currency was the creation of the
stock market. In order to tap foreign capital and improve the financial po-
sitions of selected state-owned enterprises (SOEs), stock markets were es-
tablished in Shanghai and Shenzhen in December 1990 and July 1991
respectively. (7) The state remained the largest shareholder in the SOEs listed
on the stock market, and the shares up for sale to non-state parties (i.e. the
circulating shares) were limited. To shield the domestic financial market
from external shocks, government officials created segmented stock mar-
kets that limited the types of buyers and specified trading currencies. The
dual financial market system was established with A-shares traded in RMB
by Chinese nationals/enterprises only, and B-shares traded in either the US
Dollar or Hong Kong Dollar by foreign individual or institutional investors. (8)
The segregation of domestic and international markets has persisted to
varying degrees until now. Greater integration with the international finan-
cial market has been gradually underway with the example of the Shang-
hai-Hong Kong Stock Connect since November 2014. Market capitalisation
through the stock market has increased from US$0.2 billion in 1991 to
US$369.7 billion in 2012 (see Graph 1). As of May 2015, China’s two stock
markets combined already ranked second in the world in market capitali-
sation (US$14.2 trillion). (9)Yet, unlike other financial markets, China’s stock
market does not allow genuine valuation of listed companies to be reflected
in the traded share prices, because the CCP controls the ownership of the
listed companies. (10) For the regulation of the financial market, the China
Securities Regulatory Committee (CSRC, Zhongguo zhengquan jiandu guanli
weiyuanhui 中國證券監督管理委員會) was established in 1992 and later
became a national regulatory body under the State Council. 
In order to promote the use of the RMB abroad, Chinese policymakers grad-
ually allowed greater cross-border RMB-denominated transactions and
opened the capital account. Financial markets, both domestic (onshore) and
foreign (offshore), are of great help in this process. Hong Kong, as a Special
Administrative Region of China that practices a different set of laws with a
well-established financial sector, provides a useful offshore testing ground. A
number of steps have been made since 2002, including introduction of the
Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors (QFII) programme to allow foreign
investors to buy A-shares in 2002, the establishment of an offshore RMB cen-
tre in Hong Kong in 2004, etc. In short, the various strategies were to stimulate
demand for the RMB in the international market and increase liquidity of the
RMB on a global scale. In 2013, the Third Plenary Session of the 18th CCP Con-
gress re-affirmed China’s commitment to a gradual loosening of capital con-
trol and allowing a greater role for the market in setting the exchange rate,
with the aim of a greater degree of RMB internationalisation. (11) It marked
China’s pledge to pursue financial reform in the direction of marketisation.
Significant slump in the Chinese stock
market in June-July
In early April 2015, state media encouraged domestic investors to take
part in the stock market. Some media reports relayed the perception that
the Chinese government would support a bullish market. (12) Subsequently,
the number of individual investor registrations reached a record high of 92
million in July. (13) The SSE Composite Index rose 36% in three months, from
3,810 points on 1 April to 5,166 points on 12 June. When the CSRC realised
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the potential for a financial bubble, it attempted to assert greater regulation
but unintentionally pushed the stock market over the edge by scaring off
profiteers. In mid-June, the Shanghai A-shares stock market went into a sud-
den slump, from 5,166 points on 12 June to 3,507 points on 8 July (the low-
est point before the RMB devaluation), representing a 32% drop within a
month. To prevent the crash from worsening, policymakers solicited help
from state-owned financial agencies dubbed the “National Team,” of which
the China Securities Finance Corporation (CSFC, Zhongguo zhengquan jin-
rong gufen youxian gongsi 中國證券金融股份有限公司) has been a major
player since late June. (14) In the midst of the market crash, the regulatory
body CSRC, as financially supported by the PBOC, dispensed over RMB 100
billion of funds to 21 brokerages to purchase shares of blue-chips as well
as small- and medium-sized listed companies through the CSFC. (15) The
CSRC also prohibited shareholders with more than 5% of a listed company’s
shares from selling off their shares in a six-month time period, among other
orders. Also, more than 1,600 of the 2,800 listed companies in Shanghai’s
and Shenzhen’s stock markets were permitted to suspend trading on 8 July,
representing 57% of the total listed companies in China at its height. The
vast majority of the trade suspensions had no clear and legitimate reason. (16)
In sum, the authorities were trying various means unconventional to global
investors in an attempt to prevent China’s stock market from sliding indef-
initely. The actions taken by policymakers were received by two divergent
views. While domestic individual investors earnestly awaited more rescues
so that their wealth in the stock market could be retained, some analysts
looked at the measures with bewilderment and regarded them as defying
market rules. Hong Kong media in general regarded the actions as a “brutal
rescue of the stock market” (baoli jiushi暴力救市).
An unexpected devaluation of the RMB in
August amidst China’s economic slowdown
Soon after the stock market rout in June-July, the PBOC unexpectedly an-
nounced a new mechanism to adjust the exchange rate of the RMB on 11
August and set the RMB’s mid-point at the previous day’s closing value. The
surprise move by the PBOC triggered a devaluation of the RMB by 1.9% in
one day, the biggest single-day decrease in the yuan’s history. (17) Initially,
the RMB devaluation was largely interpreted as China’s desperate move to
revive its slower-than-expected economic growth and proof of the govern-
ment’s inability to manage the stock market problem. (18) Pessimistic senti-
ment soon spread among stock markets across the world. On 24 August,
stock markets in China, Hong Kong, and other Asian countries experienced
massive sell-offs. Subsequently, stock markets in the US and Europe plunged
(see Table 1). Referring to the global stock market turbulence, the Chinese
and foreign media generally labelled 24 August as “Black Monday.”
In the shadow of further yuan devaluation and gloomy prospects for
China’s economy, the volume of capital flight (19) from China continued at
an unprecedented rate. As shown by the decreased volume of foreign re-
serves the PBOC used to defend the RMB’s value, at least US$42.5 billion
and 93.9 billion left China in July and August respectively. (20) The decrease
in August was the largest on record. (21) In fact, the capital outflow in this
period was not a sudden occurrence but an intensification of capital flight
in progress since 2014, when investors started to realise the possibility of
China’s economic slowdown (see Graph 2). In tandem with other ways to
stabilise the yuan, the PBOC has also been actively buying offshore RMB
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Stock Markets Index drop on 24 August Remarks
Shanghai, China 8.5% Largest one-day drop in 8 years
Shenzhen, China 7.7%
Hong Kong 5.2%
Taiwan 4.8% A record one-day drop by 7.5% in the trading period
Korea 2.5%
Japan 4.6% Biggest one-day drop in more than 2 years
Australia 4.4%
The US 3.1% A record one-day drop by 1,000 points at its opening
Pan-European FTSE Eurofirst 300 5.4% Largest one day drop in 7 years
Table 1 – Global Stock Market Rout on 24 August 2015
Sources: Bloomberg, Financial Times, South China Morning Post, CNN, Southern Weekly.
to prevent its value from further decline, narrowing the gap between the
onshore and offshore currency prices in the second half of September. (22)
On the international level, the G20 met to discuss how to neutralise the
impact of RMB devaluation on the global economy and avoid competitive
devaluation. (23) The US Federal Reserve also postponed its plan for an in-
terest rate hike in view of global economic uncertainties. (24)
Showing reservations on the strategies deployed to save the stock market
in June-July, policymakers behaved differently this time. They rolled out a
number of market-oriented measures to stabilise the market, including low-
ering the required reserve ratio of the banks as well as reducing the interest
rate on 25 August. (25) At the same time, officers under the Ministry of Public
Security investigated those who were suspected to be manipulating the
market or “spreading rumours” online. Wang Xiaolu 王曉璐, a journalist from
the respected financial magazine Caijing財經, was arrested and put on the
television to make a “confession” for his media reporting, which allegedly
caused turbulence in the stock market. (26) Officers also combatted under-
ground banks so as to stem illegal cross-border money transfer. (27)
The foundation of stock market volatility in
China and its impact
To a certain extent, the characteristics of China’s stock market can explain
its plunge from mid-June to late-August. First of all, unlike other stock mar-
kets dominated by institutional investors, the stock market in China is dom-
inated by small-capital individual investors. With this kind of investor
composition, shares can easily be oversold when fears set in. Second, as Pro-
fessor Dan Luo from the University of Nottingham pointed out, China-listed
firms have an “extremely low dividend pay-out rate.” Investors tend to bet
on an increase in share price instead of the firm’s performance in the real
economy, and they might rush to sell off shares when prices drop rapidly.
This contributes to market volatility. (28) Third, before the stock market rout
in June, it was reported that the stock market was dominated by leveraged
credit in search of speculative gains. This has been made possible by poorly
regulated “shadow banking” as well as web-based financing firms. “Shadow
banking” as an alternative to state-run banks allows people to obtain credit
on par with traditional banks, but quicker, easier, and without much regula-
tion, making financial bubbles more easily formed. Moreover, brokers were
allowed to lend margin credit to investors to buy shares. By early July, margin
credit in the Chinese stock market stood at RMB 2 trillion, four times as much
as a year earlier, and accounted for 18% of the market’s free-floating shares,
compared with less than 6% in New York. More importantly, leveraged credit
in the stock market actually came from the re-packaging of financial prod-
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Source: State Administration of Foreign Exchange, www.safe.gov.cn (accessed on 29 October 2015).
ucts from traditional banks through financial intermediates. The linkage be-
tween the banking system and the stock market constitutes a systemic risk
that the banking system will suffer if the stock market crashes. If it is true
that the CCP has been relying on the banking system to secure its firm grip
on political power, the collapse of the banking system could result in dire
consequences for the CCP. (29) These analyses are consistent with the official
explanation for the need for state intervention. President Xi Jinping 習近平
defended the government’s action to intervene in the stock market as nec-
essary and preventive, as he claimed to have contained fear among investors
and cushioned systemic risk in the financial sector.  
Moreover, although worries over China’s economic slowdown have had a
huge impact on stock markets, analysts argued that the stock market plunge
in late August did not have a great impact on China’s real economy. For one
thing, the financial market in China is largely detached from the real econ-
omy. Historically, the rise and fall of China’s stock market capitalisation was
not synchronised with the growth or decline of China’s GDP. (30) Also, the
extent to which private companies or Chinese households utilise the stock
market as a way to finance investment or to generate wealth is not signif-
icant. Corporate financing through the stock market accounts for only about
5% of corporate fund-raising in China, while less than 7% of China’s total
population participates in the stock market. (31)
Debating the causes of the RMB devaluation
Since the RMB devaluation there has been speculation over the motive be-
hind it. Some analysts propose that Chinese policymakers used the RMB de-
valuation as a way to induce export growth and revive its economy as China’s
economic slowdown has become more evident with poor indices in exports,
shipments, (32) and the manufacturing sector. (33) Some other analysts argue,
conversely, that the initial scale of RMB devaluation was not large enough to
be advantageous to Chinese firms. (34) Also, they point out that continued de-
valuation of the yuan might backfire on China’s economy, as it would put an
extra burden on the loan repayment capacity of Chinese enterprises, which re-
cently bear over US$160 billion of debt. (35) The Chinese Premier Li Keqiang 李
克強 emphasised in early September that it was not their intention to boost
export growth by the devaluation, nor did they intend to start a currency
war. (36) As the data show, the RMB exchange rate was allowed to fluctuate in
both directions after 11 August (see Graph 3).
Other analysts argue that the devaluation was more like a market correction.
Dr. Liu Shaojia from Brunel University suggests that the RMB devaluation was
an adjustment to the macro-economic situation in China, where the inflation
rate was high but the value of the RMB continued growing in the past year.
Nicholas R. Lardy, an economist specialising in China’s economy, concurred
that it was a long overdue market correction. (37) Framing the devaluation saga
in this light, analysts tend to believe that the Chinese government is paving
the way toward a market-oriented currency exchange mechanism for the yuan.
In line with the above analysis, some analysts propose that the reason for
the RMB devaluation is to demonstrate China’s determination to include
the RMB in the IMF’s international currency reserve basket of Special Draw-
ing Rights (SDR) (38) by assigning the market a greater role in setting the ex-
change rate of the RMB before the IMF makes the decision in November
2015. Zhou Xiaochuan周小川, the Governor of the PBOC, in April publicly
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Graph 3 – RMB currency exchange rate against $US from 17 October 2014 to 17 October 2015








Source: Hang Seng Bank, “Foreign Currency T/T Exchange Rates,” https://bank.hangseng.com/1/2/rates/foreign-currency-tt-exchange-rates (accessed on 21 November 2015).
associated the capital account opening with China’s bid for the RMB’s in-
clusion in the SDR. (39) After the RMB devaluation on 11 August, the IMF also
endorsed it as a step toward market-oriented reform. (40)
Market-oriented currency reform: Rhetorical
or substantial?
In 2012, the Chinese government announced the 12th 5-year Guidance for
the Development and Reform of the Financial Industry (jinrongye fazhan he
gaige “shi er wu” guihua金融業發展和改革“十二五”規劃), which stressed its
main direction as assigning a greater role to the market in deciding the ex-
change rate, to further open the capital account, and to diversify foreign re-
serves. (41) However, Arthur R. Kroeber, Senior Fellow of Foreign Policy at the
Brookings-Tsinghua Center, pointed out that while the CCP asserted it would
give the market a “decisive role” in financial reform, the Party is also prepared
to maintain the “dominant role” of the state sector. (42) If the ultimate objective
of all economic reforms since Deng Xiaoping has always been to maintain the
political power of the CCP, (43) how much the CCP would loosen its grip on eco-
nomic control in exchange for the benefits of obeying market rules remains a
big question in financial reform. It may well depend on the personal attitude
of President Xi, who has taken leadership of the two CCP groups overseeing
economic policies, namely the Central Leading Group for Financial and Eco-
nomic Affairs (zhongyang caijing lingdao xiaozu 中央財經領導小組) and the
Central Leading Group for Comprehensively Deepening Reforms (zhongyang
quanmian shenhua gaige lingdao xiaozu中央全面深化改革領導小組).
RMB internationalisation is certainly a catalyst for China’s currency reform.
To achieve this policy goal, scholars point out that a market-oriented exchange
rate, opening of the capital account, and a freely convertible RMB are impor-
tant prerequisites. (44) In the process, the Chinese government must confront
the trilemma of international monetary policy, where the independence to
dictate domestic interest rates (independent monetary policy), the free flow
of capital (opening of the capital account), and currency stability (fixed ex-
change rate) cannot be achieved at the same time. A country can at best
achieve only two of the three policy outcomes at one time. Over the past
decades, the trilemma has been overshadowed by the continued net inflow of
foreign capital into China and the PBOC’s ability to absorb the inflow by in-
creasing foreign reserves. The situation has changed in recent years, however,
when China’s economic slowdown has been accompanied by capital out-
flow. (45) If China is determined to press ahead with a market-oriented exchange
rate regime for the sake of the RMB’s inclusion in the SDR in the short run and
its internationalisation in the long run, the gradual opening of the capital ac-
count and exposing the PBOC to the monetary trilemma is inevitable. (46)While
China rolled out measures conducive to market-oriented currency reform be-
fore and after the RMB devaluation, there are signs that the state would not
shy away when necessary. Yam Chi-kong 任志剛, the former Chief Executive
of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, has insisted in a paper on the need for
capital control even if the RMB should become fully convertible. (47) In April,
PBOC Governor Zhou argued that China would not pursue a freely or fully
convertible RMB regime but rather a managed convertible one in order to
maintain the currency’s value and safe financial environment. (48)
Conclusion
In retrospect, the RMB devaluation seems more a part of the RMB inter-
nationalisation process than an arbitrary move to rescue China’s economic
slowdown. As a country with the world’s second largest economy, China
needs to pay much more attention to policy communication with the world
of investors as a lesson learnt from the RMB devaluation saga in August.
The majority of critics attributed the global market turbulence in August to
communication problems on the part of Chinese policymakers. (49) Moreover,
the stock market since mid-2015 is in need of deeper reform if the Chinese
government wants to establish a financial market alternative to bank loans
for investment and be better equipped to provide direct financing to SOEs
or private corporations. This would build a financial market that contributes
to the prosperity of the real economy instead of having one speculative in
nature.
Under the policy goal of internationalising the yuan, whether China can
successfully pursue a market-oriented exchange rate regime while achieving
managed capital flow and monetary policy independence at the same time
remains to be seen. What is certain is that China’s financial reform in gen-
eral, and currency reform in particular, will continue. Yet, given the role of
the financial sector in the CCP’s political power, and the sensitivity of for-
eign-local financial connections as perceived by the CCP, the end product
of financial reform may take a form unfamiliar to Western counterparts.
After all, besides sustainable economic prosperity, other concerns such as
political legitimacy, social stability, and the CCP’s monopolistic rule are all
essential to China’s leaders in the pursuit of “capitalism with Chinese char-
acteristics.” (50)
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